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MICKENS v. COMMONWEALTH
249 Va. 423, 457 S.E.2d 9 (1995)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Walter Mickens, Jr. was convicted of capital murder under Vir-
ginia Code section 18.2-31(5).1 During the sentencing phase of the
bifurcated trial, the jury fixed the sentence at death based on both the
vileness and future dangerousness predicates. The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the conviction and sentence. Mickens then petitioned
the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari claiming that the
Virginia rule barring admission of parole ineligibility evidence pre-
vented the jury from considering all mitigating factors. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the




The Supreme Court of Virginia remanded the case to the trial court
for a new sentencing hearing because under Simmons, Mickens had a
right to present evidence of his ineligibility for parole if sentenced to
life in prison rather than death.4
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Because of the decision in Simmons, this case at first appears to be
one in which the Supreme Court of Virginia simply had no choice but
to remand. However, two issues the court did not consider deserve
mention here.
I. Automatic Salvage of Death Sentence
The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that when a death
sentence is based on both the vileness and future dangerousness
predicates, the invalidation of one predicate does not invalidate the
death sentence.5 Instead, a new sentencing hearing is not required and
the sentence may stand based on the remaining predicate. This rule is
questionable under recent United States Supreme Court precedent, 6 but
was claimed by the Supreme Court of Virginia as recently as its initial
I Mickens v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 423,457 S.E.2d 9 (1995).
2 Id. For a further discussion of the facts of this case, see Mickens
v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395, 442 S.E.2d 678 (1994), and case
summary of Mickens, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 23 (1994).
3 114 S.Ct. 2187 (1994).
4 Mickens, 249 Va. at 425,457 S.E.2d at 10.
5See Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99,334 S.E.2d 838 (1985);
Stout v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 126, 376 S.E.2d 288 (1989).
6 See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222,232 (1992), holding that states
which require the jury to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors must
perform areweighing if one factor is found invalid; in states which do not
require such a weighing, the Court "assume[s] a determination by the
state appellate court that the invalid factor would not have made a
difference to the jury's determination" would be made. See also Sochor
v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992), and Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S.
738 (1990).




On this remand from the United States Supreme Court, however,
the Supreme Court of Virginia did not make or even discuss a claim that
Simmons error affects only the future dangerousness aggravating fac-
tor, and therefore, although the future dangerousness finding may have
been invalid, the death sentence was still valid based on the vileness
predicate. This may mean that the Supreme Court of Virginia has
discarded the automatic salvage of death sentences rule.8
I. Proper Grounds for a Simmons Claim
In Simmons v. South Carolina, the United States Supreme Court
held that a jury is entitled to know if the capital murder defendant is
ineligible for parole.9 The Court decided this on the basis of the due
process right to defend against the state's case for death. 10 The court,
however, specifically did not address Simmons's claim that the jury
was also entitled to this information on grounds that it was mitigation
evidence, or that precluding it violated the Eighth Amendment require-
ment of increased reliability in capital sentencing.
11
In the present case, Mickens raised his Simmons claim solely on
the grounds that parole ineligibility was mitigating evidence. The
Supreme Court of Virginia rigidly enforces default and waiver,
12
including requirements that the "same claim" be raised throughout.
13
In this case, however, the court awarded a new sentencing hearing
rather than deny relief because Mickens did not make his Simmons
claim on the exact grounds decided by the United States Supreme
Court.
As of January 1, 1995, the Virginia Code now requires that no
parole be given in any capital case where the defendant is sentenced to
life in prison. Consequently, defense attorneys should always request
Simmons jury instructions. This should be done even in cases where the
Commonwealth states that it is officially seeking to prove only vileness
and not future dangerousness for at least two reasons. First, in Simmons,
future dangerousness was not a statutory aggravating factor in South
Carolina. Thus, it was not something which the prosecution had to
prove. Future dangerousness was injected into the case by remarks of
one prosecutor. Whether the prosecution relies upon the statutory
8 However, it should be noted that the Supreme Court of Virginia did
not expressly reject the rule.
9 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2193.
10M.
111d. at n.4.
12 See, e.g., Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 427 S.E.2d
411 (1993), and case summary of Beavers, Capital Defense Digest, Vol.
6, No. 1, p.2 6 (1993); Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121,410 S.E.2d
254 (1991); George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 411 S.E.2d 12
(1991); Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 402 S.E.2d 218
(1991); Stockton v. Commonwealth,241 Va. 192,402 S.E.2d 196(1991),
and case summary of Stockton, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p.
18 (1991); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850
(1989); Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403,374 S.E.2d 46 (1988).
13 See, e.g., Yeatts v. Murray, 249 Va. 285,455 S.E.2d 18 (1995),
and case summary of Yeatts v. Commonwealth, Capital Defense Digest,
this issue.
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aggravator in Virginia officially or not, references to future dangerous-
ness will be similarly difficult to keep out ofa case. Arguably, the factor
is always a concern of jurors. Second, parole ineligibility is in fact a
mitigating factor. 14 Precluding mitigation evidence is of course consti-
14 For additional discussion of the Supreme Court of Virginia's
treatment of Simmons issues, see case summaries, Joseph v. Common-
wealth, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No.2, p. 2 3 (1995); Cardwell v.
Commonwealth, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 25 (1995);
Wilson v. Commonwealth, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 2 7
tutionally impermissible regardless of the aggravating factors relied
upon by the Commonwealth.
15
Summary and analysis by:
Jeanne-Marie S. Raymond
(1995); and Ramdass v. Commonwealth and Wright v. Commonwealth,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 31 (1995)
15 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104 (1982).
ROYAL V. COMMONWEALTH
250 Va. 110, 458 S.E.2d 575 (1995)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On February 21, 1994, Thomas Lee Royal met with three accom-
plices near a shopping center. Royal handed each accomplice a gun, and
they proceeded across the center. They intended to kill Officer Curtis
Cooper. Instead of finding him, however, they encountered Officer
Kenneth E. Wallace, sitting in his patrol car. Royal fired two shots at
Wallace from a .38 caliber handgun.1
Royal was indicted for the capital murder of a police officer and the
use of a firearm to commit the murder. He entered guilty pleas to both
charges.2 The pleas were taken based on a stipulation of the facts.
At the penalty phase, the Commonwealth's evidence included the
testimony of the probation officer who prepared the pre-sentence report,
an investigating officer, and the intended victim. The Commonwealth
also put on Dr. Ryans, a forensic psychiatrist, who explained that Royal
had an anti-social personality and that he could not definitely conclude
that Royal would not be a future danger to society.
3
Based upon a finding of future dangerousness, the trial judge
sentenced Royal to death.4 Royal appealed his death sentence, challeng-
ing the judge's finding of future dangerousness and arguing thatthejudge
succumbed to community pressure in imposing the death penalty.
5
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the convictions and death
sentence, finding that the trial judge, who also had acted as sentencer,
properly applied the future dangerousness factor and that the record did
not support Royal's claim that public pressure had led to his sentence.
6
I Royal v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 110, 112-13,458 S.E.2d 575,
576 (1995).
21d. at 112, 458 S.E.2d at 576.
3 Id. at 113-14,458 S.E.2d at 576-77.
4 1d. at 115,458 S.E.2d at 577.
5 Id. at 115, 119,458 S.E.2d at 577, 579.
6 The court rejected all of defendant's assignments of error. Some
of the rulings provide little if any guidance because they apply broad,
settled principles of law to facts that are specific to the case being
reviewed. Issues that will not be addressed in this summary include: (1)
limitation of evidence to past criminal record in determining future
dangerousness; (2) failure to limit evidence relating to the killing to that
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Erroneous Capital Murder Charge
The primary difficulty with the Supreme Court of Virginia's opin-
ion goes to an issue apparently not raised on appeal: based on the
stipulation as recited by the court, Royal did not commit capital murder.
The Code provision reads that the killing ofa law officer is capital murder
only when "such killing is for the purpose of interfering with the
performance of his official duties."7 But, according to the stipulation,
although Officer Wallace was sitting in his patrol car, Royal did not kill
him to prevent him from carrying out police activities. Rather, the
stipulated facts state that Royal killed Wallace simply because Wallace
had the misfortune of being where the defendant thought he would find
the intended victim.
8
Virginia Code section 18.2-31(6) requires a purposeful interfer-
ence on the part of the culprit. It is similar to section 18.2-31(9) which
requires that the killing take place in order to further the commission or
attempted commission of a drug transaction. 9 Moreover, because this
claim goes to the court's jurisdiction to try the defendant in the first place,
it is not a claim which is to be viewed as subject to default.10 The court
had no power to try him under section 18.2-31(6).
Counsel should remember that a close reading of section 18.2-31
often reveals that the Commonwealth cannot charge capital murder.
Although Virginia death penalty law is in many ways unfavorable to the
defendant, its capital murder statute has narrow requirements that some-
times are overlooked by defense counsel. The first step, therefore, should
always be to carefully review the facts under the statute and file a motion
to dismiss the indictment if the facts cannot support a capital murder
charge.
stipulated in the guilt phase; (3) failure to establish a prima facie case of
future dangerousness.
7 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (6).
8 250 Va. at 113,458 S.E.2d at 576. The Supreme Court of Virginia
does not make clear why Royal wanted to kill Cooper. But itis clear from
the stipulated facts that he did not kill Wallace for the purpose of
interfering with police activities.
9 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2.31 (9). (emphasis added).
10 For a discussion of procedural default, see Groot, To Attain The
Ends of Justice: Confronting Virginia's Default Rules in Capital Cases,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol.6, No.2, p. 44 (1994).
